STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) ON SENATE FLOOR ON
JANUARY
, 1959~

Mr. President:
I cannot help but feel that the Senate itself, as an institu
tion, is at this moment under attack and in peril of destruction.
As is so often the case, the most imminent danger to this, as to
many other institutions, lies from within rather than from without.
Surely the proponents of the pending motion do not envisage the
depth and breadth of their proposal.
Tradition, in and of itself, is no complete answer to any
problem.

Nevertheless, long-standing traditions are seldom main

tained without sufficient reason.

Almost invariably, traditions

serve as a warning beacon of obscure, but sound and logical,
purposes.

A beacon of more than 170 years unbroken tradition stands

as a warning of the seriousness of the proposal before this body.
Should the motion to proceed to a consideration of the rules be
favorably considered by this body, this 170-year tradition will
be destroyed, and regardless of a subsequent return to the same
method of procedure by this body after sober reflection, the
tradition will be broken, and the beacon extinguished forever.
Even more vital, however, are the logical purposes which
prompted the unshattered existence of this tradition.

Foremost

among these purposes is that of insuring an orderly procedure, so
vital in such an authoritative body.
Complaints have been made that this body is not only deliber
ative, but on occasions, dilatory, when operating under its present
rules.

Yet some of those who voice these complaints would have

this body declare itself, by an affirmative vote to proceed to
the adoption of rules, to be a non-continuing body and, therefore,
without any rules whatsoever.

It has been suggested that during

the interim between this vote and the adoption of new rules by a
majority vote of this body, that the Senate proceed under "general
parliamentary law" or, as one self-styled authority suggested,
under Robert's Rules of Order.

I cannot conceive of a more perfect

example of jumping from the frying pan into the fire than to
proceed from a disagreement as to what the rules should be, to a
disagreement on what the rules are, as would be the case if this
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body attempted to operate under "general parliamentary law", or
even Robert 9 s Rules of Order.
The Senate is not an ordinary parliamentary body.

Analogies

to the procedure of other parliamentary bodies have little, if
any, relevancy to the question before us.

For instance, the House

of Representatives is exclusively a legislative body.
is far more.

The Senate

In addition to being a legislative body, it performs,

by constitutional mandate, both executive and judicial functions.
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
President shall share with the Senate his executive treaty-making
power and his power of appointment of the officers of the United
States.

Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution requires of

the Senate a judicial function by reposing in the Senate the sole
power to try all impeachments.
The uniqueness of the Senate is not confined, by any means,
to its variety of . functions.

There are innumerable other aspects

about this body which prevent its orderly operation at any time
under parliamentary law other than its own rules, adopted in
accordance with the provisions of those rules.

For example, almost

all parliamentary procedures presuppose that any main question,
after due notice, can be decided by at least a majority of the
members of the particular body using the parliamentary procedure.
Any Senate rules which presupposed such a conclusion would be
inoperable, for the Constitution itself specifies the necessity
for two-thirds majority for action an many matters.

Among these

issues requiring a two-thirds majority by constitutional mandate
are for conviction on impeachment; to expel a member; to override
a presidential veto; to concur in a treaty; to call a constitutional
convention; to propose a constitutional amendment to the States
and to constitute a quorom when the Senate is choosing a Vice
President.

The very fact that each State, regardless of its

population, has equal representation in this body belies the thought
of simple majority rule in its deliberation.
It is this very uniqueness which has compelled so many to
conclude that the Senate had a degree of continuity unknown to other
parliamentary bodies.
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The Founding Fathers themselves, in drafting the Constitution,
provided for this continuity by establishing a six-year term of
office for each Senator, so that a minimum of two-thirds of the
entire body would continue from one session to the next.

Had the

Founding Fathers desired continuity only, but less than a continuing
body, they could have provided for a staggered term of four years
for a Senator with one-half of the Senate returning from one .
session to the next.

This would not have provided the necessary

quorums to do business at all times, and the Senate would not
have been a continuing body.
The Senate itself has re-enforced the premise that it is a
continuing body by the unbroken precedent of continuing its rule
from one session to the next.

In recent years there are two clear

cut precedents upholding the Senate's status as a continuing body,
and even more specifically, that its rules continue from one session
to the next.

In 1953 and again in 1957, this body tabled a motion

that it proceed to take up the adoption of rules for the Senate.
In 1954, the Senate voted to condemn the late Senator McCarthy
for his conduct in a previous session.

The committee report

accompanying the resolution stated: "The fact that the Senate is
a continuing body should require little discussion.

This has been

uniformly recognized by history, precedent and authority."
In addition, the Senate has jealously maintained its authority
to continue its committees in their operations between adjournment
and the commencement of the next ensuing session.

The Supreme

Court in the 1926 case of McGrain v. Daugherty specifically ruled
that the Senate was a continuing body and, therefore, its committees
were authorized to act during the recess after the expiration of
a Congress.
Is the purpose sought to be accomplished by the drastic action
proposed so worthy as to justify the risk of stripping the Senate's
committees of their authority to function after the date of adjourn
ment?

Is it so imperative that it justifies the abandonment of

orderly procedure for the jungle of "general parliamentary law"?
The proponents of the pending motion aver that the real
target of this all-out effort is one, and only one, Senate rule--
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the one which primarily governs the limitation of debate. · This
much maligned rule has been made the scapegoat by many groups.
Its greatest distinction, however, appears to be its seclusion
from objective consideration.
In the interest of objectivity, let us compare this rule with
Rule 29, The Previous Qµestion, of the suddenly popular Reuther's
"Robert's Rules of Order".
Rule XXII requires a two-thirds vote of the membership to end
debate on any particular measure, except the rules themselves.
A parliamentary body acting under "Robert's Rules of Order" can
end debate and force a vote on the pending question by passing a
motion of the previous question by a two-thirds majority of those
present and voting.

Even under "Robert's Rules of Order", a

majority vote, even with notice, cannot end debate.
The difference, in practical effect, is not overly large.
For example, had the limitation of debate in the Senate always
been governed by "The Previous Question" in the present "Robert's
Rules of Order", no result on previous efforts to invoke

clo.ture

would have been different from the result under the rules as they
have existed.

Had the present Rule XXII of the Senate always

controlled the limitation of debate, only in one instance would the
result on

cloture attempts have been changed.

instance to which I refer was a

The particular

cloture vote which prevailed in

1927 under a rule requiring a majority of two-thirds of those present
and voting to end debate.
The distinction between Rule XXII and ''fhe Previous Question",
though slight in practical effect, is not without a strong basis
in reason.

"Robert's Rules of Order" was designed for the general

use of societies, which, not being governmental bodies, have no
authority to compel attendance of delegates.

"Robert's Rules",

therefore, recognize the impracticality of making the actions of
those bodies for whom his rules were designed contingent on
membership.

Robert used the most practical basis for his purposes

for protecting the rights of minorities in societies generally.
The United States Senate, to understate the matter, occupies
a greatly different position than the general societies for which
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"Robert's Rules" was designed.

Its membership is under oath to

support the Constitution and to well and faithfully discharge the
duties of their offices.

Surely a presumption by the rules of

regular attendance is not unduly harsh.

If it be too harsh, why

has there been no attack on the provision of Rule V which authorizes
the Sergeant-at-Arms to compel the attendance of absent Senators.
As far as limitation of debate is concerned, the only dis
tinction between Rule XXII of the Senate and the rules designed
for Podunk's local Liar's Club is the pre-supposition by the Senate
rules of regular attendance of its members.

Is this distinction

too great for what has been called the greatest deliberative body
on earth?
Consider what the Senate is being asked to risk in an effort
to erase this distinction, possibly in favor of a greater distinc
tion in the other direction.

The proponents of the pending motion

would have the Senate declare itself without rules.

My research

having failed to find the "general parliamentary law" codified,
I presume the Senate would next have to determine temporary rules
under which to proceed to adopt permanent rules.

As I have indi

cated, Mr. Reuther has recommended "Robert's Rules of Order".

It

is quite possibl~ even probable, that a majority of Senators would
prefer even temporary rules other than Robert's.

There are numerous

others, such as Parliamentary Procedure, by Rose Marie Grugan; Hand
book of Parliamentary Procedure, by Henry A. Davidson; Lex
Parliamentaria Americana, by Luther Stearns Cushing; Manual of
Parliamentary Practice, by Luther Stearns Cushing; Rules of
Proceeding and Debate in Deliberative Assemblies, by Luther Stearns
Cushing; Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, by
John Hatsell; A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, by Thomas Jefferson;
Manual of Legislative Procedure, by Paul Mason.

It is even

conceivable that no one of these or other complete set of rules
would be acceptable to a majority.

Can anyone anticipate the

confusion which might result from opening such a Pandora's box?
The Senate could easily spend several months debating and deciding
on temporary rules.

After that would come the more difficult and

more time consuming task of debating and agreeing on each section
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of each of the permanent rules.
order

It would be slow work under the

provided by our existing rules, but in the jungle in

which we are urged to jump, it would be almost impossible.
In the meantime, it behooves us to remember that the existence
of every committee of the Senate stems from the Senate rules,
and, therefore, the committees of the Senate would pass with the
rules.

During the succeeding indeterminable period until new

permanent rules were adopted, our committees would not be working.
Legislative business would be at a standstill.

The emergencies

of the country, both domestic and foreign, would have to run their
course while we of the Senate wrangled in an attempt to extricate
ourselves for the self-made jungle of "general parliamentary
confusion"r

Heaven forbid that we place ourselves in such a

position.
Nor would that be the end.

Should we so abandon order for

confusion, a precedent would be set for future Congresses, many
of which would then want to assert their independence and draft
their own rules.

Each group could flex its muscles and determine

its gain or loss of strength among new members.

It is conceivable

to me that eventually the first year of each session would have to
be set aside for the Senate to make its rules under which to act
on substantive matters during the second year of the session.

It

may be said that this is the wildest sort of speculation--and it is.
That is just the point.

We are asked to sacrifice the traditionally

orderly procedure of the Senate for something as to the nature of
which we can only speculate, and I might add, the only guide that
is offered to limit our speculation is our individual imagination.
not
I sincerely hope and trust that the Senate has/degenerated
to the point at which it will, at one grand sweep, shatter the
cornerstone. of its existence.

It deserves a better fate than

strangulation in a parliamentary jungle of its own making.
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